The arrival of the new economy symbolized largely by the Internet, e-commerce, and widespread digitalization of society has brought with it new issues regarding intellectual property that have been a source of controversy. one of the most controversial issues on the new intellectual property is the BM patent. ongoing issues on BM patent include the patentability of business method, the allegation of generating poor quality patent, the doubt of BM patent's contribution to R&D and innovation, and the increasing patent infringement cases. A somewhat negative view over BM patent has arisen from the belief that it does not contribute to improving social welfare.

Notwithstanding the importance of debates on the desirability of BM patent, most of the discussion have evolved around intellectual property rights issues. Although it is important to grant appropriate patents, overseeing how in fact the patent might be used is no less important. The main concern with granting a patent is the possibility of assigning monopoly power associated with that patent. If monopoly power is exercised abusively to suppress competition and innovation incentives, the social costs of granting such a patent can be enormous. Such costs can be mitigated however through competition policy. That is, competition policy can play an important role on resolving issues regarding the BM patent: this aspect has not yet received much attention.

This research brings competition policy to the forefront of the BM patent controversy. We need to move away from the discussions over BM patent from the perspective of intellectual property to discussing how competition policy should be implemented regarding BM patent cases in order to mitigate the abusive exercise of monopoly power that might accompany the patent.

Our research suggests that by utilizing competition policy adequately, social costs induced by the BM patent can be minimized. To accomplish this goal, it is required that the competitive effects of the patent be fully assessed. As a case study we chose a BM patent in Korea for which a patent revoke suit was filed by rival companies. Even though the patent revoke suit has not been resolved as yet, an analysis of the effects of the BM patent on competition assuming the patent has been effectively carried out.

The result of our study shows that those receiving the patent have potential power to put rivals at a competitive disadvantage, but it seems that it is not in their best interest to exercise this power to the extent that the patent harms rivals seriously or forces them to exit from the market. In short, the patent would not cause serious competition problems. However, this result holds only in the case that we have analyzed, and should not be generalized to all BM patent cases.