This paper empirically tests how control-ownership disparity indices affect the firm’s performance (profits and market values). In the private firms which belong to Cheabols, the control sharholder’s control-ownership disparity indices do not affect the firm’s profits and market value, which means that the Tunneling hypothesis is not supported. For testing the endogenicity problem, this paper examines that whether the firm’s profits and market value affects control- ownehship disparity indices in the next period. The results of analysis models show that dispairity indices are not significantly affected by post period profits and market value, and reults of some models point out that the firm’s control-ownership disparity indices rise even if the firm’s market value increases.

Similarly, this paper show that the government’s control-ownership disparity indices do not affect the state-owned enterprises’ profits and market value, which means that the government does not abuse its control rights onto the state-owned enterprises. However, this empirical study reported that increases in the government’s control-ownership disparity indices reduce the privatized enterprises’ profits, which means that the government abuses its control rights onto the privatized enterprises.