Two economic crises that visited the Korean economy have given rise to more pressing real time challenges.As Korea’s economy becomes more developed and, at the same time, more outwardly oriented, external shocks seem to create ever more serious domestic turmoil. Increased vulnerability might come unavoidably with increased openness. However, if every external shock leaves indelible adverse marks on basic tenets of the country’s economy such as potential output, the long term economic outlook is very bleak.

What happens with respect to the trend growth trajectory in the post 2008 period is a point of great interest in this regards. In the wake of the 1997 crisis, both economists and policy makers took to the view that the pre-crisis period growth trend was not sustainable and deceleration in growth was to be welcomed for a more stable profile of economic performance over time. Despite the distinctly lower growth profile since late 1990s, Korea’s economy ran into difficulties in 2003 due to a domestic cause(credit card burble and bust) and again in 2008 due to a truly large external shock. This suggests that the improvements in the soundness of Korean economy might have been somewhat limited.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the puzzling result that Korea’s economy fared much better in the aftermath of 2008 shock, which has been much more severe than the 1997 crisis by any metrics. one, Korea in 2008 was not encumbered by the ‘70 trillion won’problem of non-performing assets that was uncovered through messy restructuring processes as in the 1997-1998 crisis. Of course there is goingto be reckoning of non-performing assets this time aroundtoo as government’s active intervention and assistance since late 2008 surely have postponed eventual realization of losses. However, for now the order of magnitude of hidden problem is expected to be much less than that of the pre-1997 period. For one, many businesses have maintained healthy finances mainly due to robust export performances for several years before 2008.

Two, comparatively speaking, policy reactions were prompt and offered sufficient resources to stop the economy’s downward spiral. This aspect stands in strong contrast to the situations of 1997-1998, when interest rates were hiked over 20%while this time it was lowered to 2% from above 5% in about 6 months. Fiscal assistance came late and timid in 1998 whereas a large supplementary spending package came in early 2008 at the heel of the regular annual budget, adding close to 2% point to the first half growth. Furthermore, steps were taken to allay heightened fear of another foreign exchange crisis which could have easily turned into a potentially dangerous self-fulfilling expectation. Particularly useful was establishing currency swap facilities with the central banks of the US, Japan and China.

Three, very aggressive policy coordination among leading economies to counter the global financial freeze and its adverse impact on real activity has helped through two channels. First, it allowed a relatively rapid recovery of an orderly flow of financial capital in and out of Korea, and put a floor to how far Korea’s exports fell as a consequence of the global slowdown. Second, it emboldened Korean policy makers to implement market stabilization measures as well as macroeconomic supports. This is a very different picture compared to a decade ago when local policy makers would typically mention ‘consultation with the IMF’ somewhere in their responses to policy related questions. Establishing currency swap arrangements and thus allowing provision of foreign exchanges on a more normal basis, instead of the mode of emergency credit facilities a la 1997 IMF assistance, has had quite important salutaryeffects.

It is needless to say that these factors are still conjectures, requiring more systematic examination for their quantitative importance. Of course empirical approach might have to find tractable ways to examine these issues, for example it might be difficult to examine a quantitative significance of the third point that is decidedly a qualitative observation. However, comparing experiences of the other three countries that received emergency IMF funding in 1997, then and now would be doable. This examination could shed some light on to what extent Korea’s outcome in the aftermath of 2008 crisis really is unique.