As the main purpose of this paper I probe the role of the judiciary in embarking with fuller force the regulatory reform in Korea. Although courts, in general, have been very passive in regulatory reform over the past decades, they are equipped with solid bases of the Korean Constitutional such as §107-1 and §111(for the Constitutional Court of Korea) and §107-2(for the Supreme Court of Korea) in order to make meaningful contribution to regulatory reform. First of all, I define regulatory reform as exerting efforts to find an optimal method of constraining private property rights when it is necessary. I then demonstrate how judicial review can be set in motion regarding inappropriate regulations, In particular, I emphasize the comparative advantage of judicial review in regulatory review in terms of sufficient evidence, transparency, accountability, and relatively stronger independence from interest groups. Finally, I explain the doctrine of ‘regulatory taking,’ which is stipulated in §23-3 of the Korean Constitution, as a backbone of the innovative regulatory reform. I have stressed its importance over the past two decades, but, in this paper, I reexamine the doctrine and add new examples as I currently perceive its wider applicability as of 2014.